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KANAB CITY, A body politic and 
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State of Utah; GAYLEN HOYT and 
JOLYNN HOYT his wife; and ARVEL 
ROBINSON and LULA ROBINSON, his 
wife, 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VAUGHN JUL>D and ORA NELL JUDD 
his wife, ) 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
KANAB CITY, a body politic and 
) 
) 
) 
corporate under the laws of the ) 
State of Utah; GA YLEN HOYT and 
JOLYNN HOYT, his wife; and ARUEL } 
ROBINSON and LULA ROBINSON, his 
wife, 
Defendents-Aespondents. 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 18300 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS- APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by the Plaintiffs-Appellants, from a judgment 
of the Sixth Judicial District Court, the Honorable Don Ve Tibbs, 
district judge, awarded judgment to the Defendants-Respondents 
that the street in question was owned by Kanab City and said 
city was able to use anci dedicate the street in any manner that 
best serves the public. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment in that appellants 
should be declared the rightful and legal owners of the street in 
question. 
1 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This case is a consolidation of two matters. On July 8, 1978 
.appellants brought an action against respondents to a quiet title 
in two parcels of lanCJ in Kane County to wit: 
PARCEL NO. I : tleginning at the Southeast Corner 
of Lot No. I in Block 8, Plat "C" of the official survey 
of Kanab Townsite, and running thence North 208 feet; 
thence West 320 feet; thence South 208 feet; thence East 
320 feet to the place of the beginning 
PARCEL NO. 2 : All o,t the property lying immediately East 
of the above-described property cosisting of approximely 
66 feet; being that portion of property between Block 7 
and Block 8, "C" of the official survey of Kanab Townsite 
which comr.1ences at the Southwest Corner of Lot 2 in 
Block 7, Plat "C, 11 and running thence North 208 feet; 
thence West approximately 66 feet to the East boundary 
of the property described in Parcel No. I above; thence 
South 208 feet; thence East approximately 66 feet to the 
Ea st bo un da ry of Lot 2 in BI ock 7 , Plat " C . " 
Appellants also sought an injunction against respondents to 
enjoin the construction of a roaa on the auuve described real property. 
A preliminary injunction was granted on August 16, 1978 enjoining and 
restraining respondents from constructing any roads during the 
penclency of this action. 
In the second matter Kanab City filed a verified petition for 
probate deed seeking the issuance of a Probate Judge's deed to 
a portion of the property platted as Third North Street and Fourth 
West Street according to the official survey of the Kanab Townsite 
ano is the same property described in Parcel r~o. 2 above. 
Respondents objected to the issuance of a probate deed to Kanab 
City for the portion of Third North Street which lies west of a ditch 
traversing said street by means of a culvert. They also objected 
,, 
to the issua. nee of a probate deeu to any portion of Fourth West Street. 
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All of the parties stipulated and agreed at trial that a probate 
deed to Kanab City could be issued for that portion of Third North 
Street lying to the east of the ditch and culvert described above .. 
The parties further agreed that respondents are in fact and law the 
owners of the real property described abo<Se as Parcel No .. I. 
The sole issue at trial was whether a probate deed should be issued 
to Kanab City for the remaining portion of Third North Street west 
of the ditch and culvert to its intersection with Fourth West Street. 
The map described as Plaintiffs Exhibit #17 is representative of the 
streets in question. 
ARGUMENT 
POI NT I 
KANAB CITY IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN OWNERSHIP INTEREST 
IN THE DISPUTED AREA OF PARCEL NO. 2 PURSUANT TO THE 
TOWNS I TE ACT OF 1867. 
At the time a community was occupieCJ there was no need to transfer 
title to the inhabitants of that community as the Federal Townsite Act 
of 1867, 14 Stat. 541, 43 U.S. C. A., Section 718 set forth the standard: 
"That whenever any portion of public land of the Un.ited 
States has been or shall be settled upon and occupied is 
a townsite ... it shall be lawful in case such towns shall 
be incorporated, for the corporate authorities thereof and 
if not incorporatecJ for the judge of the county court for the 
couty is which such town may be situated to enter at the 
proper land office.. . . the land so settled and occupied 
in trust for the several use and benefit for the occupant 
therof, according to their respective interest ; the execution 
of which trust., ., . to be conducted under such rules and 
regulations as may be prescribed by the legislative authority 
of the State of Territory in which the same may be situated: 
. . . and provided, further, that any act of said Trustee's 
Deed not made in conformity to the rules and regulations 
herein al lucJed to sha II be void, .... ., " 
3 
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Trye Kanab Townsite resulted by grant from Congress as set forth 
in the above-described act. The laws adopted by the Territ·orial 
Legislature fo Utah provided regulations for the dispo of townsite 
land. These rules state in part as follows: 
" ... there the corporate authorities in cases where the land 
shall have been entered by then, and the judge of the 
probate, in cases where the land shall have been entered 
by them, shall cause the same to be surveyed and layed 
out to suitable blocks anci lots, and shall reserve such portions 
as may be deemed necessary for public squares, school 
houses or hospital lots, ana shall cause all necessary 
streets. road, lanes, anc.i alleys to be ; layed out through 
the same a plot which properly certified, shall be recorded 
in the Recorder's office of the county in which the same 
may be situated;. (See sections 1175 of compile laws 
of Utah, 1876) . 
Although no transcript is available the pleadings and findings 
incJicatethat both appellants and respondents Robinson and their 
preaacessors in interest have occupied, used an fenced in the land 
in question for at least eighty years and that said use may have existed 
from the time Kanab was settled and has continuec.i to the present time. 
Since appellants have shown continuous use of the property for 
many years th.~ holding of Hall vs. North Ogden City, 175 p.2d 703 
comes into play: 
"Since the lands in controversy have been in the peaceable 
notorious and open position of the Plaintiffs and their 
predecessors for many years, in order to preyail, the town 
must show some right on title to these lands under the 
proceeclings of the Fecieral Townsite act of 1867, or a ded-
ication of such lands ot the public for the use of the street 
by the owners therof under such Act. . . . " 
The faicts in the above referenced case are similar to the case at 
bar. The Court evaluateo the various equitable interests of the parties 
and stated at page 711: 
4 
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"We therefore conclude that it is sufficient occupancy to 
have thP l;;:ind fenceci in, and being used as farm land at 
the tic~e of en try. 
Plus it is clear that the equitable ownership of these lands 
were at the time they were entered, in the Plaintiffs' pre-
decessors. Had this ownership been transferred to the 
town of North Ogden? If so, it must have been by dedication 
by the owners thereof through the filing of the plat by the 
county surveyor, by Plaintiffs' predecessors filing their 
claims in the probate court without describing therein the 
lancis plated as streets, or by making the later transfers 
by reference to the North Ogden Plat, of by all of these 
facts together. 11 
Subsequent to the analysis of the equitable ownership to the 
property the Court treated the subject of whether or not ~here was 
any dedication of the street or whether there was an intent to dedicate 
any street: 
"Before a dedication of a street to the public use can 
be effecteCJ there must be either an intention to so ded-
icate such lands on the part of the owner thereof of he 
must act in such a manner as to be estopped from denying 
such intention. Such intention may be shown either by 
oral or written declarations or it may be inferred from the 
surrounding facts and circumstances fo the case but in all 
cases such intention must be clearly manifest .. 16 Am Jr. 361 
dedication, 17; 26 C.J.S., dedication #12 page 64; Harding-
vs. Jasper, 14 Cal. 642, 643. There being no showing that 
the owner had anything to do with the preparing or filling 
of the plat that fact does not tend to prove an intention 
on the part of the owners to.dedicate the streets platted 
therein to public use. Nor does the further facts that the 
original ·claims and later transfers of Plaintiffs' lands al I 
all described them by reference to the plat, under the 
facts anc.J circumstances of this case hawe such a tendency . 11 
The above analysis is relevant in the instan~ that none of the 
parties has shown or attempted to show that appellants, respondents 
Roginson or any predecessors in interest ever intended the land in 
question to be dedicated to the city for the use of the public. 
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The holding of Hall apparently standsfor the proposition that 
the mere fact that a city prepares an official map showing the 
existence of a street.? does not prove that the owner had an intention to 
c:Jeaicate the street plotted therein to the public use. (See also the 
cJissent of Justice Callister in Bonner V. Sudbary, 417 P. 2d 646 at 
page 651). 
In Automotive Products Corporation v. Provo City Corporation 
502 P2cJ 568, the Utah Court affirmed the trial courts ruling which 
awardec.; the disputed area to th plantiffs occupant. The city argued 
that it .adopted a general street plan which was designed to promote 
a public convenience anCJ that plaintiffs lessee constructed a curb 
anCJ gutter along the proposecj line of the street of the street amounted 
to implied dedication of the property to the city for street puposes. The 
ccurt ruled against the city as follows: 
"Implied aedication must be based on the intention of the land 
owner, anci that intention must be showed by word, acts 
or deecJs of the owner which might clearly manifest an 
intention to dedicate. The fact that the city prepared and 
filed a plat which eliminatecJ the city's street and their widths 
and lengths without a show in the Plainfill acquiesced in 
the plan and without a shwoing that intended to bound 
thereby would be insufficient to show an intention to ciedicae 
II 
"In this instant case there is nothing in the records to 
dedicate its property to the public use, and upon the 
comtrary the recorus Clearly indicates that the Plaintiff, 
through its managing officers, objected to the city taking 
ancJ occupying the property as a part of a public street." 
In the instant case, both appellants and respondents Robinson 
theitA predecessors in inter·est have always claimed ownership of the 
uispateo area, and respon(Jents Robinson have paid taxes on said area. 
6 
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POI NT II 
KANAB CITY ABANDONED THE LAND IN QUESTION 
In plaintiffs trial exhibit G. Kanab City Council Meeting of July 
8, 1975, the City Council voted unanimously to abandon the land in 
question pursuant to a petition of the property owners: 
11 A i-)etition of the property owners in the area of Third 
North ancJFourth 'iJest was read to the Council., The 
petition stated the property owners objection to opening 
the street from Third No. to Fourth North on Fourth West, 
and asked the Council to abandon the street at this time. 
After some discussion a motion was made by Councilman 
Aiken to abanc.ion the street. The motion was seconded 
by Councilman Swapp. Attorney Behle was asked by the 
Council to handle the abandonment of the street. The motion 
passed unanimously . 11 
Defendants, at trial were unable to show any documents indicating 
that the City Council reversed themselves on the abandonment . It 
is clear that the City did not take subsequent formal steps pursuant 
to its abanCJonment ruling and it is equally clear from the many trial 
exhibits of City Council meetings that the City never reversed their 
abandonment ruling. 
SUl'vil\,iARY AND CONCLUSION 
Appellants and its successors in interest along with Respondents 
Robinson and its successors with respect to the subject property 
possessed anci maintained said property for approximately 80 years. 
Apparently ther was no testimony as to who possessed the subject 
property prior to 1900. It is also clear that Kanab City plotted the 
subject property as a street in its survey plan of the City. It is 
equally clear that the plot was not recorded at the county recorders-
7 
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office even though it was maintained at said office. Considering the 
above the city should not have a greater interest that appellants in 
disposing of the property. 
In addi·t ion the City Council abandoned the subject property in 
an official vote of a regular City Council meeting. The vote was 
never reversed or rescinded. The last official act with respect to 
the property by the city is abandonment. Therefore juagment should 
be reversea. 
DATED THIS ____ Day of _____ 1982 
H. Delbert Welker 
Attorney for Appellants-Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE nF MAILING 
I Herby certify that maileci two copies of the foregoing brief to the 
following: 
fvlr. Kirk Heaton 
Attorney for Respondents 
Hoyts and Robinsons 
143 West Center Steet 
Kanab, Utah 87Ll71 
Mr. David Nuffer 
Attorney for Respondent 
Kanab City 
P.O. box 386' 
St. George, Utah 84770 
On the _____ cJay of ______ l982 
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